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In light of growing scholarly works on business failure across the social science domains, it is 
surprising that past studies have largely overlooked how extreme environmental shocks and ‘black 
swan’ events such as those caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and other global crisis, 
can precipitate business failures. Drawing insights from the current literature on business failure and 
the unfolding event of COVID-19, we highlight the paradoxes posed by novel exogenous shocks (that 
is, shocks that transcend past experiences) and the implications for SMEs. The pandemic has 
accelerated the reconfiguration of the relationship between state and markets, increasing the divide 
between those with political connections and those without, it may pose new legitimacy challenges for 
some players even as others seem less concerned by such matters, whilst experiential knowledge 
resources may be both an advantage and a burden.  




Prior to the commencement of the 21st century, many of the challenges facing global businesses 
revolved around how to mitigate business failure (see Amankwah‐Amoah & Syllias, 2020). However, 
in discussing both business ailments and remedies, a great deal of the literature rested on two 
fundamental assumptions: the increasing primacy of markets, and that much could be taken for granted 
about the global business ecosystem. Although the latter was not immune to periodic unexpected 
downturns, challenges took familiar forms (e.g. recessions), and a limited range of policy remedies, 
centering on generous central bank interventions to support and sustain borrowing and relieve debt, 
seemed capable of restoring growth. Recent developments, including the rise of right-wing populism 
in mature liberal markets, climate change, and most recently the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) 
pandemic have challenged these assumptions. Although climate change may have greater long-term 
consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic has had more immediate effects on the global business 
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ecosystem. Accompanying the COVID-19 pandemic with reported more than 14 million cases and 
over 600,000 fatalities globally affecting countries across Africa, Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, 
Europe, South-East Asia and Western Pacific (Worldometers, 2020; World Health Organization, 2020) 
are multiple cases of foreclosures, massive unemployment, cars repossessions and waves of business 
failures ranging from retailers, airlines, and health fitness & wellbeing centers, among several others. 
In the UK, for instance, COVID-19 has exponentially led to an increase in number of financially 
distressed companies to around “half a million firms are at risk of collapse” (Cook, & Barrett, 2020, p. 
nd). This has caused widespread economic distress, with a likely long-term impact on the global 
economy.  
According to report by the International Civil Aviation Organization (2020), COVID-19 is expected 
by the end of 2020 could lead to reductions of up to 71% of seat capacity and around 1.5 billion 
passengers globally exemplifying the precarious nature and effects of the pandemic on airline 
businesses and financial position of multiple firms that provide support services to airlines and airports. 
These demonstrate a looming problem facing industry and public policy and need for better 
understanding of conditions leading to business failure and how best to mitigate them. As recently 
observed by Walsh (2020, p. nd), “companies large and small are succumbing to the effects of the 
coronavirus” and 2020 has been projected to “set a record for so-called mega bankruptcies”. Yet, we 
lack a systematic understanding of how the pandemic can create conditions leading to business failure. 
As many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and multinational enterprises (MNEs) teeter on the 
edge of closure due to COVID-19, there is a need for deeper understanding of processes leading to 
business failure. 
There is a growing body of research on business failure (see Amankwah‐Amoah & Syllias, 2020; Boso, 
Adeleye, Donbesuur, & Gyensare, 2019; Habersang, Küberling-Jost, Reihlen, & Seckler, 2019; 
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Kücher, et al., 2020; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Rider & Negro, 2015; Shepherd, 2003). However, 
and as we have seen, past “shocks” of this nature have involved comfortingly familiar phenomena, 
making it challenging to theorize about challenges outside the realm of past experience (Wood, 2019); 
the last global pandemic, Spanish flu, occurred a century ago, when the global economy was in a very 
different place. Hence, although organizations can arguably learn from others’ failure than success, 
(Desai, 2011), there is a lack of experience in dealing with failure brought about by novel events. 
Against this backdrop, the key purpose of is to highlight how misfits and misalignments can, over time, 
generate “knock-on effects” under such circumstances, and what this might tell us about challenges 
that transcend the resources of past experience. 
In addressing the deficit in our understanding in the light of COVID-19, the study makes key 
contributions to the literature. First, although COVID-19 remains a disruptive force with long-term 
implications on global and local businesses (see Wenzel, Stanske, & Lieberman, 2020), scholars are 
yet to articulate how it shapes the processes leading to business failures. In this direction, the study 
moves beyond the widely held view that business failure is attributed to either the deterministic view 
(environmental factors) or voluntaristic (firm-specific factors) perspectives (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; 
Kücher, et al., 2020; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) through highlighting the fundamental differences 
between genuinely novel shocks and those where there is a base of relevant experiential knowledge as 
to the challenges they pose., and the new set of paradoxes this leads to The remainder of the article is 
organized along the following lines: After presenting an overview of key strands of relevant literature 
on exogenous shocks and business failure, we set out the background to COVID-19 and its effects in 
triggering business failures. The final section sets out the implications of the analysis for business 
failure research and practicing managers. 
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BUSINESS FAILURE: A REVIEW  
For analytical clarity, business failure refers to a situation where the business is no longer able to 
operate as a sustainable entity and is then forced to cease operations and lay off any employees (Fleisher 
& Wright, 2010; Sheppard, 1994). This not only prompts the retreat and exit from domestic markets, 
but also foreign ones. There are different types of business failure—one largely sudden, unpredictable 
and difficult to mitigate, the other largely protracted and punctuated by multiple events, stories, false 
starts and actions which ultimately leads to failure (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1989b; Hamilton, 2006). Thus, 
business failure is taken to means the gradual or sudden death of a business.  
Much of the literature tends to make mention of the challenges of coping with events. Broadly 
speaking, scholars have tended to adopt either the deterministic or voluntaristic perspectives to account 
for business failure (Heracleous & Werres, 2016; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004, 2010). The deterministic 
(environmental factors) perspective attributes business failure to uncontrollable or external factors over 
which managers have little or no control (see also Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). Rooted in the 
deterministic perspective is the focus on the general and industry environment conditions that may 
exacerbate business failures. Prior research in this area has typically considered business failure as an 
outcome of the process of “natural selection” and “survival of the fittest” (Andrews, Boyne & Enticott, 
2006). One of the common threads in these studies is their emphasis on how factors such as 
liberalization, declining customer demand and intense competition can trigger the process of business 
decline, leading to failure (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Early studies of business failure often explored 
general environmental factors such as technological changes, recession, general environmental 
volatility, new government taxes and deregulation as primary causes of business failure (see Silverman, 
Nickerson & Freeman, 1997). Yet, as we have seen, this literature focuses on recurrent external 
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challenges, that any business operating in a particular setting might have to cope with from time to 
time (c.f. Micelotta et al., 2017). 
A distinct stream of research entrenched in the voluntaristic perspectives suggests that bundles of firm 
attributes such as leadership, management, resources and capabilities, and firm age are the root causes 
of business failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Kücher et al., 2020). By emphasizing the influence of 
resources and capabilities in determining the life chances of organizations, this stream of research has 
attempted to counterbalance the overwhelming emphasis on external factors as primary causes of 
business failure. For instance, the liability of smallness’ perspective of business failure (Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1983) contends that business failure rates decline as the firm expands its scope of 
operations, for example, through internationalization. Accompanying firm expansion may be resource 
accumulation. There may also be gains through the increased geographical scope and scale that comes 
if the firm internationalizes, thereby spreading the risk of the business. Consequently, these buffer firms 
against sudden changes in their external environment and threats either at home or internationally (see 
also Baum, 1996). From this perspective, the essential difference between these competing views is 
the unit of analysis in examining causes of business failure. Many recent scholarly contributions have 
highlighted the interaction of firm-level and external factors as a potentially robust explanation for 
business failure (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Backing up the “commonsense” view that it is likely to 
be a combination of the two, there is a great deal of work that confirms a mix of external and internal 
factors (Dahlin et al., 2018). Yet, a limitation remains that in the realm of factors identified that might 
possibly causing failure, is that there is focus on those where past experience might aid present coping 
(c.f. Wood, 2019).  
 Business failure may stem from the mismatch between the organization and its business environment 
(Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Sabherwal, Hirschheim & Goles, 2001), that is internal and external 
7 
misfits. Internal misfit stems from mismatch between the firm’s resources, structure, practices, and 
strategy, whereas external misfit refers to the misalignment between the firm-specific factors, and the 
home, host, or global environment (see Gammeltoft et al., 2012). This suggests that over time a chain 
of events can turn a firm’s competitive advantage into liabilities and become a source of errors and 
failure. As Thompson (1967, p. 234) recognized decades ago, alignment is “a moving target”. This 
requires continuous upgrading and updating of resources and capabilities in a timely manner to avert 
environmental shift, rendering the current strategy obsolete. We now turn our attention to Figure 1 as 
our organizing framework.  




THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND COVID-19: AN OVERVIEW 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020), the COVID-19 
pandemic is regarded as one of the largest concurrent public health and economic crises in modern 
times culminating in sharp decline in consumption and consumer confidence. Indeed, COVID-19 has 
been recognized as a major exogenous shock that has altered the competitive landscape for both small 
and large firms (Wenzel et al., 2020). In many instances, it has led to collapse in demand and disruption 
of supply of many products. In respond to the crisis, governments around the globe have embraced 
border closures, instituted social distancing measures, and issued directives and guidelines to small and 
large businesses. According to Opinium Research (2020), in UK for instance, around 7% per cent of 
SMEs have already permanently closed down due to the COVID-19 and many are teetering on the 
verge of closure and collapse. Besides the closures, many firms have introduced several mitigating 
measures such as remote working, reduced hours, furlough schemes, close offices and made 
redundancies (Opinium Research, 2020). These events have posed particularly severe challenges in 
specific sectors, leading to the rapid decline and eventual exit of different types of firms including 
small and large businesses.  
In the global airline industry, for instance, following the implementations of social distancing measures 
imposed by governments, withdrawal of international passenger services and lock-down measures, 
thus no passenger airline was left unaffected by COVID-19. In this industry, the effects of COVID-19 
have manifested in mass layoffs, adoption of new costly processes, and bankruptcy/closures 
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2020). The downfall in passengers demand drained the financial resources and 
cash reserves of many airlines leading to collapse of some. Indeed, the travel and quarantine restrictions 
imposed by countries culminated in bringing about falling demand for air travel and international travel 
to a virtual standstill in early 2020 (Dunn, 2020). COVID-19 precipitated the collapsed of UK-based 
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struggling carrier Flybe in March 2020 (Salaudeen, 2020) and Trans States Airlines collapsed 
(Wolfsteller, 2020). COVID-19 also contributed to bankruptcy of Miami Air International, which 
demonstrate the high economic cost of this global health crisis. 
Around the world, many SMEs in 2020 have faced increased exposure stemming from the ongoing 
epidemic outbreak. According to the European Investment Bank (2020), COVID-19 has created a 
demand and supply shock leading to such businesses unable to raise revenue and pay rent culminating 
on financially weak firms. Indeed, SMEs are the backbone of the European economy accounting for 
around two-thirds of overall employment, and over 55% of the value-added in the non-financial 
business sector (European Investment Bank, 2020). The is partly due to the containment measures 
introduced by government around Europe and beyond that placed limit on travel and people movement 
halting or curtailing demands in several sectors such as air transport, tourism and automotive, as well, 
of course, the direct effects of the pandemic (see Dunn, 2020). The sudden “environmental shock” 
triggered by COVID-19 has exponentially depleting firms’ financial resources, insolvencies, creating 
financial distress organizations and weakening the financial position of many large and small 
businesses, and thereby forcing many to seek government support in form of subsidies, tax relief and 
other financial and non-financial support from the government (Cook, & Barrett, 2020). To a large 
extent, many sectors have been forced to “compete on sanitation” in marking their premises and 
settings to minimize potential for viral transmission. 
Many of these effects have been made much worse by excessive corporate debt. Although to classical 
agency theory, corporate borrowing kept management on a tight reign, forcing them to concentrate on 
returns, rather than empire building (Jensen, 1986), it has been evident that proliferating debt is 
ultimately unsustainable. This especially so given that a focus on borrowing and distribution may 
distract managers from orthodox economic activities centering on the generation and sale of goods 
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and/or services, resulting in core business capabilities withering away. In addition, borrowing models 
centered on assumptions that the future business environment would be sufficiently predictable to 
enable continued debt servicing. The pandemic has highlighted both the fallacy of the latter assumption 
and the excessive nature of corporate borrowing. Whilst in the UK and the US, governments were 
quick to institute measures to relieve corporate debt, a focus was on politically influential sectors, and 
insider corporations with close links to politicians. This process has left those SMEs without close ties 
to individual politicians in a difficult place. Again, promised help to small business proved partial, 
selective, and seemingly insufficient, especially when compared to the help lavished elsewhere. What 
the bailouts highlighted was the increasing reliance of markets on the state to sustain; even if temporary, 
this revealed the limitations of assumptions that markets would trump government, and the triumph of 
non-market strategies. Hence, this showed that managerial assumptions about predictable futures may 
be rendered irrelevant by events that transcend past experience.  
ORGANIZATION-ENVIRONMENT FIT 
Having set out the background of business failure, we now move on to examine the organization-
environment fit/misfit shape by exogenous shock leading to business failure. 
Institutional misfit  
Existing work highlights the challenges posed by misalignments between firms and institutions 
(Gammeltoft et al., 20120). Such misalignments can manifest due to incompatibilities of the business 
processes, decisions and routines with external requirements such as government standards, regulations 
and directives. Often such misalignments stem from assumptions as to long regulatory continuity, 
and/or predictions that future government policies would tend towards ever lighter regulation. 
Stemming from COVID-19 have been government directives to close borders, and new directives to 
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hospitality, airline and other industries aimed at curtailing people movement. It has also led to 
government interventions in the global trade of healthcare supplies and new tariffs to protect national 
strategic industries. Although COVID-19 pandemic is threatening many SMEs, they often lack the 
capacity to quickly change their business model to embrace new routines and processes. The financial 
pressures and strains on business model accompanying practicing social distancing and adhering to 
governments’ new directives make failure more likely. In summary, predictions as to the future drift 
of government policies (e.g. Liberalization) have proven incorrect. Yet, whilst there has been much 
greater government regulation, it has been uneven, poorly coordinated internationally (leading to 
competing demands on MNEs), and, in the case of a number of major economies, ranging from the US 
to Brazil, chaotic. Accordingly, this would challenge memory informed firm strategic choices. 
Traditionally, it has been held that misalignment with local institutional demands or multiplicity of the 
real-world local contexts of the organization can undermine its source of legitimacy (Lejano & 
Shankar, 2013). The firm’s environment imposes pressures on firms to modify their behavior, 
processes, methods of operations and systems to achieve institutional fit. Firms in industries such as 
aviation benefited from government support, privileged access to resources and subsidies in many 
instances. By adhering to local institutional demands, organizations enhance their legitimacy claims as 
well as improve access to local expertise and resources (Volberda et al., 2012). The behavior of some 
of the tech giants, and, at the very least, sections of the oil and gas industry might suggest that at least 
some players are sufficiently confident in their oligopolistic market status and/or political clout to be 
able to be apparently less than troubled by legitimacy concerns. Those who lack such a market and/or 
political status (e.g. SMEs) would be under much greater pressure to demonstrate legitimacy in the 
face of institutional misalignment.  
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Strategic misalignment 
Strategic misalignment occurs when the firm is unable to initiate change, upgrade and update its 
resources to respond to external environmental factors in a timely manner. Misaligned processes 
deviate from the requirements of the business environment at the time. This may stem from the inability 
to keep pace with technological breakthroughs and competitors’ actions and moves. Although strategic 
alignment can lead to developing sustainable competitive advantage, inability to maintain the 
alignment can become a liability putting the firm “on the road to disaster” (Heracleous & Werres, 
2016). Indeed, scholars have hinted that strategic misalignment can lead to failure (Miller, 1996; 
Sheppard, 1994). As Thornhill and Amit (2003) asserted business failure is more likely to occur when 
there is misalignment between the capabilities and resources of the firm and the environmental 
demands. Routines are identifiable patterns of activity embodied in how the firm interacts with internal 
and external parties/stakeholders (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Mitchell & Shaver, 2002). Old routines are 
often very difficult to change due to their deeply entrenched nature within the focal organization.  
Resource misfit refers to the mismatch between the existing resources and resource and expertise 
required to neutralize or deal with the environmental threat. The arguments suggest that the processes 
inherent in assembling, marshalling and utilizing resources can be faulty, leading to not only 
misallocation of the resources but also exposing its vulnerabilities in the wake of new competitive 
threats. Indeed, business failure is argued to stem from misalignment between unique resources and 
capabilities of the organization and demands of the new business environment such as COVID-19 (see 
also Thornhill & Amit, 2003). The inefficient resource deployment and utilization can create conditions 
for business failure to occur. In addition, underestimation or overestimation of threats can lead to 
inappropriate action being taken, leading to misallocation of resources or resource misalignment. Table 




Table 1: Dimensions of business failure research and new research questions 




theories such as 
institution-based view and 
the industrial organization. 
 Exogenous shocks such as 
technological breakthroughs 
and deregulations can 
precipitate business failures.  
 
 To what extent can COVID-19 create novel conditions for 
business failure to occur? 
 How can organizations capture the positive effects of others’ 
failure stemming from COVID-19? 




encompasses theories such 
as dynamic capabilities, 
routine-based and 
organizational ecology. 
 Resource-rich firms are able 
to buffer the effects of 
environmental changes. The 
possession and utilization of 
sub-optimal resources and 
capabilities that cause 
businesses to fail.  
 Inferior resources and 
capabilities, faulty routines 
 What role do political resources play in buffering 
organizations against environmental shocks such as COVID-
19? 
 To what extent can COVID-19 render firm current resources 
and capabilities obsolete? 
 To what extent can COVID-19 render firm routines obsolete? 
 How do firms renew their capabilities and resources to 
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and black swan events? 
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and processes, and unsuitable 
capabilities are sources of 
misfits. 
 Firms age and size play 
important role for failure 
 Do firms with narrower experiential bases cope worse with 
novel crises. 
 How does industry life cycle moderate the impact of external 
crisis and firms’ survival and superior performance? 
An integrated perspective 
(internal-external 
interface)  
 Misalignment is a powerful 
source of business failure. 
 How does interaction of firm-level and external (COVID-19) 
factors determine the pace of business failure? 
 Howe does the uneven access to political resources affect 
how organizations cope with the effects of institutional misfit 
and COVID-19? 
 As legitimacy needs of organizations have apparently 
diverged, how do organizations that lack market dominance 
and/or political influence, cope?  
Sources: synthesized from: Amankwah-Amoah & Wang, 2019a, 2019b; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018a, 2018b; Bradley et al., 2011; Habersang et 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
Although business failure is more prevalent in the 21st century, the expanding body of research is yet 
to translate into improved understanding of how novel shocks (i.e., exogenous shocks which transcend 
past experience and knowledge) like COVID-19 might precipitate business failure. In this direction, 
our analysis also underscores the point of alignment between firm-level resources and capabilities, and 
external environmental that transcend past experience as sources of external misfits. More specifically, 
although a great deal has been written about exogenous shocks (Micelotta at al., 2017), most of the 
existing literature focus on those whose form assumes familiar shapes (Wood, 2019). Yet, currently, 
there are a number of high probability novel shocks: this would not only include the present pandemic, 
but future ones of different causes and scopes (e.g. antibiotic resistant bacterial ones), and those posed 
by climate change as well as by unprecedented political instability in large developed countries such 
as the US. It might be argued that none of these developments are novel, in that there have been 
innumerable attempts to raise awareness as to their high probability and the risks they bring with them. 
Yet, because their happening transcends the past body of recent experience, and because dealing with 
them will require fundamental economic, political and environmental changes, discarding (even if 
failing) past certainties for the unknown, there is a strong inertia.  
SMEs differ from their larger counterparts in that their more limited range of scale and scope – and 
human resources - would limit the range of organizational specific experiential knowledge. This paper 
highlights how this may place them at a disadvantage when compared to their larger counterparts. 
However, paradoxically, this may also confer real advantages. A large repository of experiential 
knowledge may lead to strategy informed by comfort, involving a regression to trusted past remedies; 
those organizations that are experientially lighter may be better equipped to deal with novel shocks. 
Yet, the paradox posed by knowledge resources and experience may be rendered less important by 
other paradoxes. Although the 1990s and early 2000s were seen as an age of market supremacy, this 
period saw a gradual move towards non-market strategies by large players in the liberal markets (Wood 
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and Wright, 2015). Again, pressures towards greater competitiveness were offset by the rise of 
oligopolies in growing areas of the economy, such as internet technology, and a reliance on debt, rather 
than genuine competitiveness in the generation and sale of goods and services to secure shareholder 
value (Lazonick and Shin, 2019). In addition, all these would favor larger players and those with richer 
political ties, over smaller and emerging players. Indeed, even SME orientated bailouts in the US and 
the UK have favored insider, and some surprisingly large, players. Although regulatory shifts to cope 
with corona virus have worsened institutional misalignment, it is larger players that are in a much 
stronger position to remake rules to their own liking (McDermott, 2019). Moreover, whilst institutional 
misalignment is commonly seen as driving legitimacy seeking behavior by firms (Desai, 2011), a 
contemporary phenomenon has been of large players in specific sectors seemingly becoming less 
troubled by legitimacy concerns. The latter may have ripple effect across an economy, as others mimic 
such behavior; yet organizations with more limited resources may become even more dependent on 
those that legitimacy might confer.  
Theoretically, we extend the discourse around COVID-19 effects on businesses (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2020; Pereira, Temouri, Patnaik, & Mellahi, 2020) by extending and providing insights on the 
paradoxes generated by novel shocks around knowledge resources, strategy and legitimacy. From a 
practical standpoint, it is worth noting that the risk of business failures is likely to increase given the 
uneven and capricious nature of government bailouts in many mature and emerging markets; quite 
simply, there is no rulebook or set of best practice for guiding policy interventions. To bridge the 
alignment gaps, it is well known that renewing and upgrading a firm’s resources in a new environment 
is essential in ensuring its long-term success (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). More challenging is 
understanding the basis of such a renewal, given the high likelihood of further novel shocks, and the 
rapidly shifting boundaries between state and market.  
In addition to questions posed in Table 1, several promising avenues for future research are apparent. 
First, a promising avenue would be to explore why firms strive to learn from COVID-19 and firm 
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failures linked to COVID-19. It might also be interesting to explore the effects of national and 
organizational cultures in learning from COVID-19 related policy and firm failures. Furthermore, 
although scholars have recognized failure as an integral feature of entrepreneurship (Aldrich & 
Martinez, 2001; Baù et al., 2016; Shepherd, 2003), much of the existing research overlooks the 
continuous effects of business failure beyond the focal firm. Often small business owners leaving the 
industries stemming from COVID-19 often go unnoticed, but this presents promising avenues to 
explore how these entrepreneurs re-emerge with new firms. In addition, future studies could explore 
how firms adapt and scale up their business models when faced with extreme external shocks. It is our 




Aldrich, H. E., & Martinez, M. A. (2001). Many are called, but few are chosen: An evolutionary perspective for 
the study of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 25(4), 41–56. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2016). An integrative process model of organisational failure. Journal of Business 
Research, 69, 3388–3397. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2020). Stepping up and stepping out of COVID-19: New challenges for environmental 
sustainability policies in the global airline industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 123000. 
Amankwah‐Amoah, J., & Syllias, J. (2020). Can adopting ambitious environmental sustainability initiatives lead 
to business failures? An analytical framework. Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(1), 240-249. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., & Wang, X. (2019a). Business failures around the world: Emerging trends and new 
research agenda. Journal of Business Research, 98, 367-369. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., & Wang, X. (2019b). Opening editorial: Contemporary business risks: An overview and 
new research agenda. Journal of Business Research, 97, 208–211. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., Antwi-Agyei, I., & Zhang, H. (2018b). Integrating the dark side of competition into 
explanations of business failures: Evidence from a developing economy. European Management 
Review, 15(1), 97-109. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., Boso, N., & Antwi-Agyei, I. (2018a). The effects of business failure experience on 
successive entrepreneurial engagements: An evolutionary phase model. Group & Organization 
Management, 43(4), 648-682. 
Andrews, R., Boyne, G.A., & Enticott, G. (2006). Performance failure in the public sector. Public Management 
Review, 8, 273-296. 
Baù, M., Sieger, P., Eddleston, K. A., & Chirico, F. (2016). Fail but try again? The effects of age, gender, and 
multiple‐owner experience on failed entrepreneurs' reentry. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
Baum, J. A. C. (1996). Organizational Ecology. In Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, and Walter Nord (eds.) 
Handbook of Organization Studies: 77-114. London: Sage. 
Bradley, S., Aldrich, H., Shepherd, D. A., & Wiklund, J. (2011. Resources, environmental change, and survival: 




Boso, N., Adeleye, I., Donbesuur, F., & Gyensare, M. (2019). Do entrepreneurs always benefit from business 
failure experience?. Journal of Business Research, 98, 370-379. 
Brammer, S., Branicki, L., & Linnenluecke, M. (2020). COVID-19, Societalization and the Future of Business 
in Society. Academy of Management Perspectives, in press. 
Cook, L., & Barrett, C. (2020). How Covid-19 is escalating problem debt. Received 3-6-2020, from 
https://www.ft.com/content/4062105a-afaf-4b28-bde6-ba71d5767ec0. 
Dahlin, K.B., Chuang, Y.T. and Roulet, T.J., 2018. Opportunity, motivation, and ability to learn from failures 
and errors: Review, synthesis, and ways to move forward. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 252-
277. 
D'Aveni, R.A. (1989a). The aftermath of organizational decline: A longitudinal study of the strategic and 
managerial characteristics of declining firms. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 577–605.  
D'Aveni, R.A. (1989b). Dependability and organizational bankruptcy: An application of agency and prospect 
theory. Management Science, 35, 1120–1138.  
Desai, V. (2011). Mass media and massive failures: Determining organizational efforts to defend the field’s 
legitimacy following crises. Academy of Management Journal, 54, 263–278. 
Drazin, R., & Van de Ven, A.H. (1985). Alternative forms of fit in contingency theory. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 30(4), 514–539.  
Dunn, G. (2020). The story of the coronavirus impact on airlines in numbers. Retrieved 06.05.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/strategy/how-the-airline-industry-has-been-hit-by-the-
crisis/138554.article. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., & Martin, J.A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic Management Journal, 
21(10/11), 1105–1121. 
European Investment Bank (2020). Does This Change Everything? Small business gets sick. Retrieved 
06.05.2020, from: https://www.eib.org/en/stories/smes-coronavirus. 
Fleisher, C.S., & Wright, S. (2010). Competitive Intelligence analysis failure: diagnosing individual level causes 
and implementing organisational level remedies. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 18, 553–572. 
Freeman, J., Carroll, G.R., & Hannan, M.T. (1983. The liability of newness: Age dependence in organizational 
death rates. American Sociological Review, 48(5), 692–710. 
Gammeltoft, P., Filatotchev, I., & Hobdari, B. (2012). Emerging multinational companies and strategic fit: A 
contingency framework and future research agenda. European Management Journal, 30(3), 175-188. 
Habersang, S., Küberling-Jost, J., Reihlen, M., & Seckler, C. 2019. A Process Perspective on Organizational 
Failure: A Qualitative Meta-analysis. Journal of Management Studies, 56(1): 19-56. 
Hamilton, E. A. (2006). An exploration of the relationship between loss of legitimacy and the sudden death of 
organizations. Group & Organization Management, 31, 327-358. 
Headd, B. (2003). Redefining business success: Distinguishing between closure and failure. Small Business 
Economics, 21, 51–61. 
Heracleous, L., & Werres, K. (2016). On the road to disaster: Strategic misalignments and corporate failure. 
Long Range Planning, 1: 1-16. 
Hessels, J., Grilo, I., Thurik, R., & van der Zwan, P. (2011). Entrepreneurial exit and entrepreneurial 
engagement. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 21, 447-471. 
International Civil Aviation Organization (2020). Take-off: Guidance for Air Travel through the COVID-19 
Public Health Crisis. Montréal, Canada. 
Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic 
review, 76(2), pp.323-329. 
Kondra, A., & Hinings, C. (1998). Organizational diversity and change in institutional theory. Organization 
Studies, 19(5), 743–767. 
Kücher, A., Mayr, S., Mitter, C., Duller, C., & Feldbauer-Durstmüller, B. (2020). Firm age dynamics and causes 
of corporate bankruptcy: age dependent explanations for business failure. Review of Managerial 
Science, 14(3), 633-661. 
Lazonick, W. and Shin, J.S., 2019. Predatory Value Extraction: How the Looting of the Business Corporation 
Became the US Norm and How Sustainable Prosperity Can Be Restored. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lejano, R. P., & Shankar, S. (2013). The contextualist turn and schematics of institutional fit: Theory and a case 
study from Southern India. Policy Sci, 46, 83–102. 
McDermott, J., 2019. Corporate society: Class, property, and contemporary capitalism .Abingdon: Routledge. 
  
20 
Mellahi, K., & Wilkinson, A. (2004). Organizational failure: A critique of recent research and a proposed 
integrative framework. International Journal of Management Reviews, 5: 21–41. 
Micelotta, E., Lounsbury, M. and Greenwood, R., 2017. Pathways of institutional change: An integrative 
review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 43(6), pp.1885-1910. 
Miller, D. (1996). Configurations revisited. Strategic Management Journal 17(7), 505–512. 
Mitchell, W., & Shaver, J. M. (2002). What role do acquisitions play in Asian firms‟ global strategies? Evidence 
from the Medical Sector 1978-1995. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19(4), 489-502. 
Nadler, D.A., & Tushman, M. L. (1980). A model for diagnosing organizational behaviour. Organizational 
Dynamics, 9(2), 35-51. 
Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press. 
Opinium Research (2020). Impact of coronavirus on UK SMEs. London: Opinium Research. 
Pereira, V., Temouri, Y., Patnaik, S., & Mellahi, K. (2020). Managing and preparing for emerging infectious 
diseases: Avoiding a catastrophe. Academy of Management Perspectives, in. press. 
Rider, C.I. & Negro, G. (2015). Organizational failure and intraprofessional status loss. Organization Science, 
26, 633–649. 
Sabherwal, R., Hirschheim, R., & Goles, T. (2001). The dynamics of alignment: Insights from a punctuated 
equilibrium model. Organization Science, 12(2), 179–197. 
Salaudeen, A. (2020). African airlines lose $4.4 billion in revenue following the spread of coronavirus on the 
continent. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/19/africa/coronavirus-africa-
airlines/index.html. 
Shepherd, D. A. (2003). Learning from business failure: Propositions about the grief recovery process for the 
self-employed. Academy of Management Review, 28, 318-329. 
Sheppard, J. P. (1994). Strategy and bankruptcy: an exploration into organizational death. Journal of 
Management, 20, 795–833. 
Silverman, B., Nickerson, J., & Freeman, J. (1997). Profitability, transactional alignment and generalization 
mortality in the U.S. trucking industry. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 31–52. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2020). CORONAVIRUS (COVID-
19): SME POLICY RESPONSES. Retrieved 13.06.2020, from: https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/view/?ref=119_119680-di6h3qgi4x&title=Covid-19_SME_Policy_Responses. 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in Action. McGraw Hill, Chicago, IL. 
Thornhill, S., & Amit, R. (2003). Learning about failure: Bankruptcy, firm age, and the resource-based view. 
Organization Science, 14(5), 497–509. 
Volberda, H. W., van der Weerdt, N., Verwaal, E., Stienstra, M., & Verdu, A. J. (2012). Contingency fit, 
institutional fit, and firm performance: A metafit approach to organization–environment relationships. 
Organization Science, 23(4), 1040-1054. 
Walsh, M.W. (2020). A Tidal Wave of Bankruptcies Is Coming. Retrieved 18.06.2020, from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/business/corporate-bankruptcy-coronavirus.html?smid=tw-
share. 
Wenzel, M., Stanske, S., & Lieberman, M. B. 2020. Strategic responses to crisis. Strategic Management Journal, 
41: V7-V18. 
Wolfsteller, P. (2020b). Trans States Airlines to fold in April. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/strategy/trans-states-airlines-to-fold-in-april/137349.article. 
Wood, G. 2019. Comparative Capitalism, Long Energy Transitions and the Crisis of Liberal Markets, The 
Journal of Comparative Economic Studies, 14: 7-18. 
Wood, G. and Wright, M., 2015. Corporations and new statism: Trends and research priorities. Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 29(2), pp.271-286. 
World Health Organization (2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation report - 137. Geneva: 
WHO. 
Worldometers (2020). Coronavirus Cases. Retrieved 13.05.2020, from: 
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/. 
Zhang, H., Amankwah-Amoah, J., & Beaverstock, J. (2019). Toward a construct of dynamic capabilities 
malfunction: Insights from failed Chinese entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Research, 98, 415-429. 
